Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2652
Authors: Gregor Irwin; David Vines
Abstract: This Paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis that combines three elements ? multiple equilibria, investment collapse, and moral hazard ? in a single simple account. We locate the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly-geared financial institutions, and implicit guarantees to the financial sector that create moral-hazard. The model has a unique long-run equilibrium with over-investment as a result of the guarantees. But in the short run, in which the capital stock is fixed, there may be multiple equilibria. If foreign banks regard lending as low-risk, then it is. But if they regard lending as high-risk and charge a higher interest rate, then the costs of honouring guarantees rises, making the lending high-risk and the risk premium self-justifying. A crisis occurs with a switch to this second equilibrium in which the government is forced to renege on its guarantees; the effect is a reversal of foreign capital flows. Whether multiple equilibria exist ? and hence whether the economy is vulnerable to a crises ? depends critically on the extent of capital accumulation and the mix between debt and equity financing.
Keywords: East Asian Economic Crisis; Financial Crisis; Multiple Equilibrium; Overinvestment
JEL Codes: E44; F34; O16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| government guarantees (H81) | moral hazard (G52) |
| moral hazard (G52) | overinvestment (G31) |
| overinvestment (G31) | vulnerability to financial crises (F65) |
| high debt-to-equity ratios (G32) | overinvestment (G31) |
| perceived risk by foreign banks (F65) | interest rates (E43) |
| interest rates (E43) | collapse equilibrium (D50) |
| government guarantees (H81) | vulnerability to financial crises (F65) |