Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2621
Authors: Damien J. Neven; Larshendrik Röller
Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies that assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, ?globalization? should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance.
Keywords: conflict; merger control
JEL Codes: L40; O74; O78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| definition of the market (D40) | presence of conflict (D74) |
| positive correlation in market shares (F62) | potential for conflict (D74) |
| thresholds for merger policy (L49) | conflict scope (D74) |
| size differences between countries (O57) | likelihood of conflict (D74) |
| economic integration (F15) | conflict scope (D74) |