Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2572
Authors: Paul Klemperer
Abstract: This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful argument and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.
Keywords: auction theory; auctions; bertrand; bidding; brand loyalty; common values; ecommerce; electricity; financial crashes; litigation; mechanism design; perfect competition; private values; queues; spectrum auctions; stock markets; treasury auctions; war of attrition
JEL Codes: D42; D43; D44; D45; G14; K41; L13; L81; L94; L96
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| legal system design (K40) | expected legal expenses incurred by parties (K41) |
| auction design (D44) | economic behavior (D22) |
| auction-theoretic tools (D44) | insights into litigation systems (K41) |
| auction theory (D44) | price-setting oligopolies (D43) |
| auction mechanisms (D44) | broader economic outcomes (F69) |
| auction design (D44) | litigation systems (K41) |