The Evolution of Markets Under Entry and Standards Regulation: The Case of Global Mobile Telecommunications

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2440

Authors: Harald Gruber; Frank Verboven

Abstract: We analyse the effects of government policies, such as entry regulation and standard setting, on the evolution of an industry, the global mobile telecommunications markets during 1981-1997. Among other results, we find that countries that issue first licenses at later dates converge rather slowly and only partially, compared to early-moving countries. We find that introducing competition has a strong immediate impact on the diffusion rate, but a rather weak impact afterwards. Sequential entry is preceded by pre-emptive behaviour. These findings are consistent with the presence of consumer switching costs. Concerning standards, we find that setting a standard has a significant positive impact on diffusion for the analogue technology, but not for the digital technology. This suggests that the network advantages from having a single standard are offset by the benefits derived from the battle for developing more efficient digital systems.

Keywords: technology diffusion; entry regulation; standards and competing systems; capacity constraints; consumer switching costs; network externalities; preemption; mobile telecommunications

JEL Codes: L10; L86; O30


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
timing of first entry (C41)diffusion of mobile services (L96)
timing of first entry (C41)convergence of late movers (F12)
introduction of a second entrant (L13)diffusion of mobile services (L96)
competition (L13)diffusion of mobile services (L96)
simultaneous entry (C30)diffusion speed (C69)
sequential entry (C69)diffusion speed (C69)
setting a technological standard (O30)diffusion of analogue technology (O33)
setting a technological standard (O30)diffusion during digital phase (C69)

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