Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2402
Authors: Francesco Caselli; Massimo Morelli
Abstract: We present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials. Quality has (at least) two dimensions: competence and honesty. Voters prefer competent and honest policymakers, so high-quality citizens have a greater chance of being elected to office. But low-quality citizens have a 'comparative advantage' in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than the market wages of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). In the political equilibrium, the average quality of the elected body depends on the structure of rewards from holding public office. Under the assumption that the rewards from office are increasing in the average quality of office holders there can be multiple equilibria in quality. Under the assumption that incumbent policymakers set the rewards for future policymakers there can be path dependence in quality.
Keywords: elected officials; corruption; competence; citizens; candidates
JEL Codes: D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Candidate quality (C52) | Electoral outcomes (K16) |
| Candidate quality (C52) | Likelihood of being elected (D79) |
| Market wages of candidates (J31) | Pool of candidates (D79) |
| Rewards from holding office (D72) | Average quality of elected officials (D72) |
| Initial conditions (Y20) | Quality of candidates (D79) |
| Quality of candidates (D79) | Governance quality (H11) |
| Path dependence (B15) | Quality of elected officials (D72) |