Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2278
Authors: Daron Acemoglu; James A. Robinson
Abstract: Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale democratization, despite its apparent costs to themselves, may be that lesser concessions would be viewed as a sign of weakness, spurring further unrest and more radical demands. The elite may therefore be forced to choose between repression and the most generous concession, a transition to full democracy.
Keywords: democracy; redistribution; repression; revolution
JEL Codes: D72; D74; O15; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| social unrest (O17) | choice of regime transition (democratization vs. repression) (D70) |
| type of elite (Z29) | likelihood of democratization (D72) |
| perceived threat of revolution (F52) | elite's choice between repression and democratization (D70) |
| partial concessions (H29) | further unrest (Y50) |
| social unrest (O17) | demands for full democratization (P39) |