Nominal Contracts and Monetary Targets

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2215

Authors: Patrick Minford; Eric Nowell; Bruce Webb

Abstract: We look for a theoretical justification of nominal wage contracts in household diversification of risk. We assume it is more costly for households than for firms to use financial markets for this purpose. In a calibrated general equilibrium model we find from stochastic simulation that if both productivity and monetary shocks are temporary then optimal wage contracts are overwhelmingly nominal. When the dominant shock-usually money - is persistent, wage indexation or the auction wage share (each a form of 'real wage protection') rises sharply. OECD experience in the 1970s fits the model's prediction of high wage protection; for the 1990s the model predicts little reduction in protection. The model suggests that the persistence in monetary shocks- implying that the central bank targets the growth rate rather than the level of the money supply (or the price level), or 'base drift' as currently practised throughout the OECD- not only raises wage protection but also reduces welfare in a world where productivity shocks are persistent, as both theory and our empirical results suggest they are. This suggests that this central bank practice is due for review.

Keywords: monetary targets; base drift; nominal rigidity; indexation of loans

JEL Codes: E52


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
temporary productivity shocks (J69)optimal wage contracts are nominal (J41)
temporary monetary shocks (E39)optimal wage contracts are nominal (J41)
persistent monetary shocks (E39)wage indexation increases (J38)
persistent monetary shocks (E39)auction wage shares increase (J39)
persistent monetary shocks (E39)wage protection increases (J38)
persistent monetary shocks + persistent productivity shocks (E39)overall welfare decreases (I30)

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