Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2212
Authors: Tryphon Kollintzas; Apostolis Philippopoulos; Vanghelis Vassilatos
Abstract: This paper provides a coherent, logical framework that connects the main issues concerning fiscal policy in an economic and monetary union. The focus is on normative issues within the European Union.
Keywords: tax competition; cooperation; fiscal federalism
JEL Codes: E61; F42; H7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| absence of coordination in national fiscal policies (F42) | inefficiencies (D61) |
| absence of coordination in national fiscal policies (F42) | excessive deficits (H62) |
| uncoordinated policies (F42) | negative spillover effects (D62) |
| supranational fiscal rules (F55) | mitigate issues (H84) |
| supranational fiscal rules (F55) | reduce likelihood of moral hazard problems (G52) |
| explicit coordination of national fiscal policies (F42) | improve overall economic outcomes (F69) |
| joint optimization (C61) | higher tax rates (H29) |
| joint optimization (C61) | better public goods provision (H49) |