Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2163
Authors: Paul Klemperer
Abstract: This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and bibliographies.
Keywords: auctions; bidding; auction theory; common-value auctions; private value auctions; mechanism design
JEL Codes: D44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| risk aversion (D81) | auction revenue (D44) |
| collusion (D74) | auction revenue (D44) |
| auction structure (D44) | final prices (P22) |
| auction structure (D44) | auction revenue (D44) |
| bidder characteristics (D44) | revenue outcomes (H27) |