Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2156
Authors: Graziella Bertocchi; Michael Spagat
Abstract: Group 1 holds political power. Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the upheaval probability by coopting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign Group 3. Improvements in upheaval technology lead to less cooptation. Increasing the relative size of Group 1 implies larger cooptation payments to a smaller group, decreasing the total resources committed to cooptation. In an extension in which Group 3 also threatens Group 1, although less destructively than does Group 2, cooptation transfers are reduced. Growth causes political stabilization. The theory applies to the origin of the welfare state, post-communist privatization and other situations.
Keywords: cooptation; welfare state; privatization; upheaval
JEL Codes: D3; D74; H3; P26
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| group 1 (C92) | group 3 (Y90) |
| group 2 (Y90) | group 1 (C92) |
| improvements in upheaval technology (O33) | cooptation (J54) |
| group 1 size (C92) | cooptation payments (J54) |
| economic growth (O49) | upheaval probabilities (C62) |