Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18618
Authors: Tim Besley
Abstract: This paper develops a canonical model of deliberative democracy as part of a policy process. It studies how deliberation affects incentives and behavior in three contexts: (i) compliance with policies (ii) equilibrium policy choices in a representative democracy and (iii) incentives to protest. The paper explores whether there are welfare gains from increased deliberation and how these depend on changes in equilibrium behavior.
Keywords: democracy; deliberation
JEL Codes: D72; D78; H11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| deliberation (D70) | compliance (K40) |
| deliberation (D70) | citizens' beliefs (D72) |
| citizens' beliefs (D72) | compliance (K40) |
| deliberation (D70) | policy effectiveness (D78) |
| deliberation (D70) | public opinion (D72) |
| public opinion (D72) | political outcomes (D72) |
| deliberation (D70) | protest incentives (D72) |