Keep Your Enemies Closer: Strategic Platform Adjustments During US and French Elections

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18490

Authors: rafael di tella; randy kotti; caroline lepennec; vincent pons

Abstract: We study changes in political discourse during campaigns, using a novel dataset of candidate websites for U.S. House elections, 2002-2016, and manifestos for French parliamentary and local elections, 1958-2022. We find that candidates move to the center in ideology and rhetorical complexity between the first round (or primary) and the second round (or general election). This convergence reflects candidates’ strategic adjustment to their competitor, as predicted by the median voter theorem: Using an RDD, we show that candidates converge to the platform of opponents who narrowly qualified for the last round, as opposed to those who narrowly failed to qualify.

Keywords: political economy; elections; platform adjustments

JEL Codes: D72; P00


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Candidates adjust their ideological positions toward the center (D72)Candidates move their ideological positions between election rounds (D79)
Candidates adjust their discourse complexity (D79)Candidates increase complexity in the second round (D79)
Candidates adjust their ideological positions toward the center (D72)Candidates adjust their discourse complexity (D79)
Candidates face stronger electoral threats (K16)Candidates make more pronounced adjustments (D79)

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