Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18397
Authors: Andrey Malenko; Nadya Malenko
Abstract: No abstract available
Keywords: delegation; ESG; corporate governance; voting; externalities; index funds; information aggregation
JEL Codes: D72; D82; D83; G34; K22
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| offering of voting choice based on heterogeneous preferences (D79) | excessive retention of voting rights (D72) |
| excessive retention of voting rights (D72) | prioritizing private preferences over collective information (D70) |
| prioritizing private preferences over collective information (D70) | aggregate inefficiencies (D61) |
| offering of voting choice due to information unknown to fund manager (D72) | increase in investor welfare (G19) |
| costly information collection (D82) | coordination failures (P11) |
| voting choice (D72) | less informed voting outcomes (D72) |
| information effect and preference effect (D91) | overall outcomes (P47) |