Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18281
Authors: Hans Peter Grüner
Abstract: According to standard mechanism design theory, the individual (freedom-) right not to accept a mechanism limits a planner's ability to achieve socially desirable (ex-post efficient or welfare maximizing) outcomes. This raises the question why and when individuals should be granted freedom rights at all. This paper studies under which conditions incentive problems on the design level justify the use of participation constraints. Depending on the environment, granting personal freedom rights may yield higher expected welfare than leaving the choice of a direct revelation mechanism to a random planner or to the electorate. The paper formalizes Hayek's conceptions of personal freedom and private sphere, and it permits the analysis of case sensitive optimal allocations of freedom rights. Two applications are studied in detail: mandatory vaccination and freedom of speech.
Keywords: personal freedom; private sphere; rule of law; mechanism design; participation constraints; abuse of power; vaccination; freedom of speech
JEL Codes: B25; D62; D72; D82; H41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| granting personal freedom rights (P14) | social welfare outcomes (I38) |
| freedom not to participate in a mechanism (D47) | planner's ability to achieve efficient outcomes (P11) |
| asymmetric information (D82) | inefficiencies from the right to refuse participation (D72) |
| granting personal freedom rights (P14) | welfare outcomes in mandatory vaccination (I38) |
| political systems (P16) | implementation of personal freedom rights (P14) |
| implementation of personal freedom rights (P14) | welfare implications (I30) |