Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18208
Authors: Patrick W. Schmitz
Abstract: We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two major shortcomings. First, it is focused on ex-ante investment incentives, whereas ex-post inefficiencies which are ubiquitous in the real world cannot be explained. Second, ownership does not matter when incentive contracts can be written. Both shortcomings are due to the fact that this literature has studied the case of symmetric information only. We explore how asymmetric information leads to different kinds of ex-post inefficiencies depending on the ownership structure. Moreover, we show that under asymmetric information ownership matters even when incentive contracts are feasible.
Keywords: Incomplete Contracts; Privatization; Control Rights; Asymmetric Information; Investment Incentives
JEL Codes: D86; D23; D82; H11; L33
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Ownership structure (private) (G32) | Overinvestment in cost-reducing innovations (G31) |
| Ownership structure (public) (G32) | Underinvestment in cost-reducing innovations (O39) |
| Asymmetric information (D82) | Overinvestment in cost-reducing innovations (G31) |
| Bargaining power of the manager (C78) | Implementation of innovations (O35) |
| Ownership structure (private) (G32) | Information rents (D33) |