Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18172
Authors: Samuel Bazzi; Claudio Labanca
Abstract: This paper explores the labor market returns to working on a victorious political campaign. Using unique administrative data from Brazil, we track the earnings and employment of campaign workers before and after close elections spanning nearly 20 years. We identify sizable returns to working for a winning campaign, especially in areas with a large informal sector and for workers connected to newly elected challengers. The returns are concentrated in the public sector, where connected hires are relatively more qualified. Our results suggest a potential upside to patronage as campaign connections create new pathways to public administration for young, high-ability workers.
Keywords: Labor Markets; Patronage; Political Connections
JEL Codes: D72; D73; J45; J46; P00
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Working for a winning campaign (K16) | Significant increases in annual earnings (J31) |
| Working for a winning campaign (K16) | Increased hours worked (J22) |
| Working for a winning campaign (K16) | Higher hourly wages (J31) |
| Connected to winning candidates (D79) | 55% more likely to be employed in the public sector (J45) |
| Deeper connections to the campaign (Y50) | Larger returns to labor (J39) |
| Campaign connections facilitate entry into public sector employment (J68) | Stable employment for qualified individuals (J68) |
| Campaign labor connections (J89) | Valuable pathways into stable employment (J68) |