Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18165
Authors: Arthur Silve; Thierry Verdier
Abstract: We introduce a dynamic model that investigates the persistence and evolution of elite-dominated societies, where inherited political capital determines one’s social standing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the distribution of exit options in the evolution of political inclusiveness across generations. An elite comparatively more mobile than the masses generally entrenches a politically stratified society, whereas a more widespread distribution of exit options can encourage inclusiveness. Under certain conditions differential mobility may still induce political inclusiveness across generations. Exit options across different political entities lead to a joint evolution of local power structures.
Keywords: political dynasties; elite dynamics; exit options; rent-seeking; political spillovers
JEL Codes: D72; F42; H26; P16; P48
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| exit options (Y60) | political inclusiveness (D72) |
| mobile elite (L96) | politically stratified society (P16) |
| widespread distribution of exit options (D39) | inclusiveness (I24) |
| exit options (Y60) | persistence of elite-dominated societies (P17) |
| no-entry and no-exit conditions (C62) | mobility of political lineages (J62) |
| no-entry and no-exit conditions (C62) | transmission of political capital (P16) |