Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18111
Authors: Marco Battaglini; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza; Eleonora Patacchini
Abstract: We study vote trading among U.S. Congress members. By tracking roll-call votes within bills across five legislatures and politicians' personal connections made during the school years, we document a propensity of connected legislators to vote together that depends on how salient the bill is to the politicians' legislative agenda. Although this activity does not seem to enhance U.S. Congress members' legislative effectiveness, vote trading is a strong predictor of future promotions to position of leadership.
Keywords: logrolling; rollcall voting; US Congress; personal relationships; party discipline
JEL Codes: D72; D74; D91
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Alumni connections (Y80) | Voting behavior (D72) |
| Majority of alumni connections voting a certain way (D79) | Voting behavior (D72) |
| Vote trading (D72) | Future promotions to leadership positions (M51) |
| Vote trading (D72) | Legislative effectiveness (D72) |