Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18090
Authors: Wouter Dessein; Alexander Frankel; Navin Kartik
Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the trend of many colleges moving to test-optional, and in some cases test-blind, admissions policies. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college is able to admit a student body that it prefers, such as one with more diversity. But how can observing less information allow a college to improve its decisions? We argue that test-optional policies may be driven by social pressure on colleges' admission decisions. We propose a model of college admissions in which a college disagrees with society on which students should be admitted. We show how the college can use a test-optional policy to reduce its "disagreement cost" with society, regardless of whether this results in a preferred student pool. We discuss which students either benefit from or are harmed by a test-optional policy. In an application, we study how a ban on using race in admissions may result in more colleges going test-optional or test blind.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| test-optional policies (C52) | reduced disagreement costs (D80) |
| test-optional policies (C52) | more favorable perception of admissions practices (I24) |
| societal preferences (P36) | college admissions decisions (I23) |
| college admissions decisions (I23) | perceived social cost of admissions decisions (D79) |
| test-optional policies (C52) | societal expectations alignment (Z13) |
| test-optional policies (C52) | benefits for students from less selective backgrounds (I24) |
| test-optional policies (C52) | disadvantages for students from more selective backgrounds (I24) |