Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18085
Authors: Desiree Desierto; Mark Koyama
Abstract: The political economy of medieval Europe was shaped by alliances between lords and vassals, forged through peaceful and violent means. We model coalition formation through bargaining or by conquest, and where members can rebel against their coalition. We derive conditions under which a realm unites under one rule — the grand coalition, or remains fragmented into several coalitions. We motivate our analysis with key historical episodes, from the Frankish Kingdom in the 5th to 10th centuries and England in the 11th to 15th centuries.
Keywords: Bargaining; Coalitions; Conflict
JEL Codes: C72; C78; D74; N43
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Larger and more immovable resources (E22) | Increased likelihood of an alliance being formed (D74) |
| Costs of fighting (H56) | Coalition dynamics (D74) |
| Costs associated with the weakest members of the coalition (D79) | Overall stability and likelihood of consolidation (C62) |