Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP18053
Authors: Guilhem Cassan; Lakshmi Iyer; Rinchan Mirza
Abstract: We examine how political participation and political competition are shaped by two class-based extensions of the franchise in 20th-century India. Creating a new dataset of district level political outcomes between 1921 and 1957, we find that both the partial franchise extension of 1935 and the universal suffrage reform of 1950 led to limited increases in citizen participation as voters or candidates, and neither reform had a significant effect on measures of political competition. Despite the limited effects on political outcomes, districts with greater enfranchisement increases experienced higher education provision by provincial governments.
Keywords: democratization; colonial rule; india; franchise extension; political participation; political competition
JEL Codes: D72; N45; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Enfranchisement reforms (K16) | Citizen participation (voter share) (D72) |
| Increased enfranchisement (K16) | Number of candidates per 1000 registered voters (D79) |
| Enfranchisement reforms (K16) | Political competition (D72) |
| Enfranchisement reforms (K16) | Primary education spending (H52) |