Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1797
Authors: Daron Acemoglu; James A. Robinson
Abstract: During the nineteenth century, most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by political elites to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.
Keywords: democracy; enfranchisement; growth; inequality; political commitment; redistribution; revolution
JEL Codes: D72; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| extension of the franchise (K16) | threat of revolution (D74) |
| threat of revolution (D74) | democratization (D72) |
| democratization (D72) | commitment to redistribution (P26) |
| democratization (D72) | decline in inequality (F62) |
| inequality (D63) | threat of revolution (D74) |
| democratization (D72) | change in identity of the median voter (D79) |
| change in identity of the median voter (D79) | future political equilibria (D59) |
| future political equilibria (D59) | commitment to redistribution (P26) |
| lack of democratization (P26) | high inequality and low output (D31) |
| initial equality and shared growth (F62) | prevent social unrest (P37) |