Information Acquisition Ahead of Monetary Policy Announcements

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17773

Authors: Michael Ehrmann; Paul Hubert

Abstract: How do financial markets acquire information about upcoming monetary policy decisions, beyond their reaction to central bank signals? This paper hypothesises that sharing information among investors can improve expectations, especially in the presence of disagreement or uncertainty about the economy. To test this hypothesis, the paper studies monetary policy-related content on Twitter during the “quiet period” before European Central Bank announcements, when policymakers refrain from public statements related to monetary policy. Conditional on large disagreement about the economic outlook, higher Twitter traffic is associated with smaller monetary policy surprises, suggesting that exchanging private signals among investors can help improve expectations.

Keywords: central bank communication; quiet period; twitter; market expectations; information processing

JEL Codes: D83; E52; E58; G14


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Higher Twitter traffic during the ECB's quiet period (C41)Smaller monetary policy surprises (E49)
High disagreement about the economic outlook + Increase in Twitter traffic (E32)Decrease in the magnitude of monetary policy surprises (E39)
Increased information exchange among market participants (G14)More accurate expectations regarding monetary policy (E49)
Tweets discussing monetary policy (E52)More accurate market expectations (D84)
Expert and non-expert tweets (C91)Enhanced accuracy of market expectations (D84)

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