Pursuing Environmental and Social Objectives through Trade Agreements

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17706

Authors: Joseph Francois; Bernard Hoekman; Miriam Manchin; Filippo Santi

Abstract: Using a large dataset covering more than 180 countries and spanning several decades, we employ a SDID estimator to identify the extent to which trade agreements incorporating non-trade provisions (labor standards, environmental protection and civil and political rights) are associated with improvements in corresponding non-trade per- formance indicators. We distinguish between binding (enforceable) and non-binding pro- visions in trade agreements, and also control for the allocation of official development assistance targeting these three non-trade policy areas. Overall, the results suggest that efforts made to date to include non-trade provisions in trade agreements have not resulted in consistent desired (better) non-trade outcomes.

Keywords: Nontrade policy objectives; Trade agreements; Labor standards; Environmental protection; Civil rights

JEL Codes: F13; F16; F17; F18; F35; O19


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
NTPs in trade agreements (F13)labor and civil rights indicators (J89)
binding labor-related provisions in EU PTAs (J58)worker protection measures (J81)
nonbinding environmental provisions (F18)official development assistance (ODA) (F35)
nonbinding environmental provisions (F18)environmental quality indicators (Q56)
binding NTPs (F33)forest coverage (Q23)
binding NTPs (F33)PM2.5 emissions and ozone exposure (Q53)
nonbinding provisions (Y20)nontrade outcomes (F19)

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