Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17584
Authors: Antonio Cabrales; Pablo Braas; Mara Paz Espinosa; Diego Jorrat
Abstract: We experimentally study a game in which success requires a sufficient total contribution by members of a group. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the chance and the total effort required for success. A theoretical model with max-min preferences towards ambiguity predicts higher contributions under ambiguity than under risk. However, in a large representative sample of the Spanish population (1,500 participants) we find that the ATE of ambiguity on contributions is zero. The main significant interaction with the personal characteristics of the participants is with risk attitudes, and it increases contributions. This suggests that policymakers concerned with ambiguous problems (like climate change) do not need to worry excessively about ambiguity.
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JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Ambiguity (D80) | Contributions (D64) |
| Risk Aversion (D81) | Contributions (D64) |
| Risk Aversion + Ambiguity (D81) | Contributions (D64) |
| Risk Aversion (D81) | Overestimate Contributions of Others (D64) |
| Overestimate Contributions of Others (D64) | Contributions (D64) |
| Ambiguity + Risk Aversion (D81) | Contributions (D64) |