Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17538
Authors: Andrea Mattozzi; David Levine
Abstract: We study a model of electoral competition in which two politicians with different office motivations set party platforms and both politicians and grass- roots can provide electoral effort. While the underlying structure of the model is asymmetric, we show that both parties have an equal chance of winning the election. In equilibrium, however, only the most office motivated politician matters for policy polarization and welfare: a kind of Gresham’s law for politicians. The greater this office motivation, the greater is polarization and the lower is welfare. Less interest in politics means also greater polarization and lower welfare.
Keywords: Elections; Politicians; Polarization
JEL Codes: D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| office motivation (M54) | polarization (C46) |
| office motivation (M54) | welfare (I38) |
| polarization (C46) | welfare (I38) |
| office motivation (M54) | strategic choices in platform positioning (D49) |