Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17531
Authors: Gregory S Crawford; Matteo Courthoud; Regina Seibel; Simon Zuzek
Abstract: There is an active policy debate seeking to understand whether Amazon first-party entry in competition with third-party merchants harms these merchants, and ultimately consumers, on Amazon Marketplace. Some argue that the exploitation of third-party data permits seller expropriation and reduces innovation while others claim that such entry permits theinternalization of important externalities, benefiting consumers and merchants alike. We seek to inform this debate by measuring the predictors and effects of Amazon first-party retail entry on consumer and third-party merchant outcomes in the Home & Kitchen department of Germany’s Marketplace between 2016 and 2021. We find Amazon entry both within and across products is associated with modest positive effects on both consumer and third-party merchant outcomesmore consistent with mild market expansion than with appropriating third-party sales. We find that both Amazon and large third-party merchants’ entry is associated with fewer subsequent new product introductions, but that these are consistent with regression to the mean rather than causal effects on innovation. Finally, we find that the predictors of Amazon’s within-productentry decisions are more consistent with a strategy that makes Marketplace more attractive to consumers than of third-party seller expropriation, including consideration of predictors based on aggregated Marketplace data. While the empirical setting presented challenges for estimating causal effects, our results are broadly inconsistent with systematic adverse effects ofAmazon entry on Amazon Marketplace.
Keywords: Amazon Marketplace; Digital Platforms; Hybrid Platforms; Entry; Expropriation
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Amazon's entry into existing products (L17) | modest positive effects on consumer and third-party merchant outcomes (F61) |
| Amazon's entry into existing products (L17) | slight decrease in third-party prices (D49) |
| Amazon's entry into existing products (L17) | slight decrease in product availability (L15) |
| Amazon's entry into existing products (L17) | no significant change in total third-party revenue (H27) |
| Amazon's entry into existing products (L17) | no significant change in the number of active merchants (E42) |
| Amazon's entry and large third-party merchants' entry (L81) | fewer subsequent new product introductions by smaller merchants (D40) |
| Amazon's entry decisions (L11) | strategy aimed at enhancing marketplace attractiveness to consumers (L10) |
| Amazon's entry into new products (L81) | increase in total quantities sold of third-party substitute products (L19) |
| Amazon's entry into new products (L81) | no significant changes in average third-party prices (P22) |
| Amazon's entry into new products (L81) | no significant changes in total revenue (H27) |