Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID Response in Russia

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17523

Authors: Konstantin Sonin; Natalia Lamberova

Abstract: Restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic were decried as an assault on individual freedoms, but were they, actually? In an authoritarian regime, yes. Using data from 83 Russian regions and the two-way fixed-effects design, we show that the extent of information manipulation measured by the difference between the excess mortality and the reported COVID-19 deaths, and repression such as arrests and detentions for violating lockdown rules were influenced by the strength of the local civil society and the opposition share in local parliaments. The tactics came at a price: the misinformation did reduce the compliance. These findings provide new evidence that authoritarian regimes, which might seem to be well-equipped to implement restrictive measures, are actually ill-suited to deal with public health challenges. Also, our results show that repression complements propaganda: more arrests increases the extent of information manipulation.

Keywords: COVID-19; Institutions; Civil Society; Authoritarian Control

JEL Codes: P16; D7; P4


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Information manipulation (difference between excess mortality and reported COVID-19 deaths) (I12)Share of United Russia in regional parliaments (R19)
Local civil society strength (L39)Information manipulation (D83)
Repression (prosecutions under Article 63 of the administrative code) (K42)Compliance with COVID-19 restrictions (H26)
Information manipulation (D83)Compliance with COVID-19 restrictions (H26)
Local civil society strength (L39)Repression (prosecutions under Article 63 of the administrative code) (K42)
Excess deaths (I12)Repression (prosecutions under Article 63 of the administrative code) (K42)

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