Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17481
Authors: Georg Kirchsteiger; Tom Lenaerts; Remi Suchon
Abstract: In sequential social dilemmas with stranger matching, initiating cooperation is inherently risky for the first mover. The disclosure of the second mover’s past actions may be necessary to instigate cooperation. We experimentally compare the effect of mandatory and voluntary disclosure with nondisclosure in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma situation. Our results confirm the positive effects of disclosure on cooperation. We also find that voluntary disclosure is as effective as mandatory one, which, is surprising given the results of existing literature on this topic. With voluntary disclosure, second movers with a good track record decided to disclose because they, expect that not disclosing signals non-cooperativeness. First movers interpret nondisclosure, correctly as a signal of non-cooperativeness. Therefore, they cooperate, less than half as often when the second mover does not disclose.
Keywords: Information Disclosure; Sequential Social Dilemma
JEL Codes: C7; C92; D8; D9
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| existence of a record system (P14) | likelihood of cooperative outcomes (C71) |
| mandatory disclosure (G38) | cooperation rates of first movers (p1s) (C71) |
| voluntary disclosure (G38) | cooperation rates of first movers (p1s) (C71) |
| voluntary disclosure is as effective as mandatory disclosure (G38) | cooperation rates of first movers (p1s) (C71) |
| presence of noise (R41) | effectiveness of information disclosure (G38) |
| skepticism in voluntary disclosure scenarios (D82) | reduced cooperation rates (D70) |
| strategic situation (sequential aspect) (C73) | effectiveness of disclosure mechanisms (G38) |