Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17478
Authors: Jeanne Hagenbach; Charlotte Saucet
Abstract: We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Skepticism is lower when skeptical beliefs are self-threatening than in neutral settings. When skeptical beliefs are self-serving, skepticism is not enhanced compared to neutral settings. These results demonstrate that individuals' exercise of skepticism depends on the conclusions of skeptical inferences.
Keywords: Disclosure games; Hard information; Unraveling result; Skepticism; Motivated beliefs
JEL Codes: C72; C91; D82; D91
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| self-threatening beliefs (D91) | lower skepticism (D81) |
| neutral settings (Y20) | higher skepticism (D80) |
| favorable outcomes (P17) | increased skepticism (D80) |
| unfavorable information (D82) | decreased skepticism (G41) |
| skeptical beliefs aligned with preferences (D91) | lower skepticism (D81) |
| skeptical beliefs misaligned with preferences (D91) | higher skepticism (D80) |