Monopsony Makes Firms Not Only Small but Also Unproductive: Why East Germany Has Not Converged

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17302

Authors: Rüdiger Bachmann; Christian Bayer; Heiko Stüber; Felix Wellschmied

Abstract: When employers face a trade-off between growing large and paying low wages---that is, when they have monopsony power---some productive employers will decide to acquire fewer customers, forgo sales, and remain small. These decisions have adverse consequences for aggregate labor productivity. Using high-quality administrative data from Germany, we document that East German plants (compared to West German ones) face a steeper size-wage curve, invest less into marketing, and remain smaller. A model with labor market monopsony, product market power, and customer acquisition matching these features of the data predicts 10 percent lower aggregate labor productivity in East Germany.

Keywords: aggregate productivity; plant heterogeneity; unions; monopsony power; size-wage curve; monopolistic competition; customer capital; size distortions

JEL Codes: E20; E23; E24; J20; J42; J50


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
monopsony power (J42)plant size (L25)
monopsony power (J42)productivity (O49)
steeper size-wage curve (J31)fewer customer acquisitions (M31)
fewer customer acquisitions (M31)lower aggregate productivity (O49)
size-wage curve steepness (J31)plant size distribution compression (D39)
plant size distribution compression (D39)lower productivity (O49)
lack of large plants (Q24)lower average wages (J31)
lack of large plants (Q24)lower productivity levels (O49)
differences in size-wage curve (J31)productivity gap (O49)

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