Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17198
Authors: James A. Robinson
Abstract: Despite the low levels of taxation and public good provision in Africa, I provideevidence that a large proportion of Africans prefer lower taxation and fewer public goods. Thiscannot be explained by standard arguments about problems of accountability, governance or statecapacity. Instead I argue that it reflects deeply seated ideas about the nature of the state and itspotential threats to the autonomy of society. I show the historic social contracts in Africa rarelyfeatured taxation and kept the state to limited jurisdictions. These social contracts have in manyways reproduced themselves and influence the way Africa is governed today.
Keywords: taxation; public goods; state capacity; social contract
JEL Codes: J6; H11; O1; O11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| historical social contracts (B15) | contemporary attitudes towards taxation (H26) |
| historical social contracts (B15) | preference for lower taxes (H29) |
| state capacity (H11) | tax aversion (H26) |
| governance (G38) | tax acceptance (H26) |
| historical political institutions (B15) | current attitudes towards taxation (H26) |