Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17178
Authors: Andrea Prat; Tommaso Valletti; Bo Cowgill
Abstract: We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. A model of firm lobbying shows that concentration and regulation may be either strategic complements or substitutes. Using data for the past 20 years in the US, we study whether merging firms’ influence activity increases or decreases after a merger. We document an increase in lobbying activity and we find some evidence for an increase in campaign contributions.
Keywords: Industrial Concentration; Lobbying; Mergers
JEL Codes: D72; G34; L10; L51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| mergers (G34) | political power (P26) |
| anticipation effect (D84) | lobbying spending (D72) |
| mergers (G34) | lobbying spending (D72) |
| mergers (G34) | campaign contributions (K16) |