Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17069
Authors: Dana Foarta
Abstract: The organizational structure of the bureaucracy is a key determinant of policy outcomes. Bureaucratic agencies exhibit wide variation in their organizational capacity, which allows politicians to strategically shape policy implementation. This paper examines what bureaucratic structure implies for the ability of voters to hold politi cians electorally accountable. It explicitly models differences in organizational capacityacross bureaucratic agencies and considers a problem where a politician must decide not only which policy to choose but which agency, or combination of agencies, will implement it. The choice of implementation feeds back into the choice of policy and this, in turn, affects how voters perceive the performance of the incumbent. This creates a chain of interdependence from agency structure to policy choice and political accountability. The formal model shows that the variation in organizational capacity serves the interests of voters by improving electoral control of politicians.
Keywords: organizational capacity; electoral accountability; bureaucratic politics
JEL Codes: D72; D73; D82; H11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| variation in bureaucratic capacity (D73) | electoral accountability (D72) |
| agency choice (D82) | voter perceptions of incumbent performance (D72) |
| bureaucratic capacity (D73) | voter perceptions of incumbent performance (D72) |
| higher capacity agencies (H76) | electoral accountability (D72) |
| funding levels of high-capacity agencies (I29) | electoral accountability (D72) |
| agency choice (D82) | policy implementation (D78) |
| policy implementation (D78) | electoral accountability (D72) |