Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP17040
Authors: Simon Jantschgi; Bary Pradelski; Marek Pycia
Abstract: We provide the first definition of a Double Auction that applies to both finite and infinite markets and does not rely on any regularity assumptions. In particular, our definition allows ties in reported values. In all markets, our Double Auction clears the market, and implements a Walrasian equilibrium. Our Double Auction nests as a special cases the standard k-Double Auction for finite markets and the Double Auction for continuous and strictly monotone demand and supply for infinite markets. We also show that the convergence of finite to infinite Double Auctions obtains in absence of any regularity assumptions.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Double auction mechanism (D44) | Market clearing (D41) |
| Double auction mechanism (D44) | Walrasian equilibrium (D50) |
| Market size (L25) | Efficacy of auction mechanism (D44) |