Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16874
Authors: Marek Pycia; Madhav Raghavan
Abstract: We show that the first-price auction with no reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and efficient in equilibrium. The first-price auction with optimal reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and revenue maximizing.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: C72; D44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| first-price auction with no reserve price (D44) | nonbossy (Y70) |
| first-price auction with no reserve price (D44) | individually rational (D01) |
| first-price auction with no reserve price (D44) | efficient (D61) |
| first-price auction with optimal reserve price (D44) | nonbossy (Y70) |
| first-price auction with optimal reserve price (D44) | individually rational (D01) |
| first-price auction with optimal reserve price (D44) | revenue-maximizing (D40) |