Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16873
Authors: Kristof Madarasz; Marek Pycia
Abstract: This paper provides an explanation of the so-called privacy paradox and describes a more general informational ’irrelevance’ result. We show that in a large class of imperfect information dynamic games between the buyer, the seller, and privacy platforms, the buyer chooses not to bear any direct cost of protecting her privacy even if leakage of her information affects the prices she faces and hence her surplus from trade. More generally, we show that the informed party’s choice of privacy (mode of communication) is driven solely by the direct cost of talk rather than by the information such talk conveys: choosing between different privacy options, the buyer always chooses a cheapest option irrespective of its and its alternatives’ informational characteristics.
Keywords: privacy; protection; tracking; defaults; dynamic pricing
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Cost of privacy options (P22) | Buyer choice of privacy mode (D19) |
| Market structure (D49) | Buyer behavior regarding privacy protection (D18) |
| Cost (D61) | Choice of least costly privacy platform (D79) |