Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16872
Authors: Marek Pycia; M Utku Nver
Abstract: We study mechanism design and preference aggregation in environments in which the space of social alternatives is discrete and the preference domain is rich, as in standard models of social choice and so-called allocation without transfers. We show that a mechanism (or aggregation rule) selects the best outcome with respect to some resolute Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, it is Pareto efficient and auditable. We further show that auditability implies non-bossiness and is implied by the conjunction of non-bossiness and individual strategy-proofness, and that the later conjunction is equivalent to group strategy-proofness as well as to Maskin monotonicity. As applications, we derive new characterizations in voting and allocation domains.
Keywords: strategyproofness; pareto efficiency; arrovian preference aggregation; auditability; nonbossiness; voting; house allocation
JEL Codes: C78; D78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| A mechanism is Arrovian efficient (D61) | Pareto efficient (D61) |
| A mechanism is Arrovian efficient (D61) | auditable (M42) |
| auditability (M42) | nonbossiness (M54) |
| individual strategyproofness + nonbossiness (C72) | group strategyproofness + Maskin monotonicity (C71) |
| Pareto efficient mechanisms (D47) | Arrovian efficiency (D61) |