Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16777
Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol; Alice Mesnard; Tiffanie Perrault
Abstract: We study how temporary visa schemes can be designed to drive smugglers out of business while meeting labor market demand in host countries. The policy trade-off between migration control and ending human smuggling can be overcome by combining internal and external controls with a regulated market for temporary visas. In this market, visa duration and price are set at "eviction" levels, designed to throttle smuggling activity. We use information on irregular migration from Senegal to Spain and the Democratic Republic of Congo to South Africa to calibrate the eviction prices of visas for these two routes. Our results highlight important constraints for governments seeking to prevent temporary workers from overstaying, especially on South-North routes such as Senegal to Spain. We suggest combining a regulated market for visas with tighter sanctions against employers of undocumented workers as a new way forward.
Keywords: immigration; human smuggling; market structure; legalization
JEL Codes: F22; I18; L51; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| introduction of temporary foreign work permits (TFWPs) (J68) | reduced demand for smugglers (F55) |
| price of visas set at eviction levels (P22) | smugglers unable to profit (F18) |
| introduction of temporary foreign work permits (TFWPs) (J68) | reduction in smuggling activity (F55) |
| enforcement of sanctions against employers of undocumented workers (K37) | effectiveness of TFWPs (J68) |
| reduction in smuggling activity (F55) | achieved through internal and external controls (O36) |