Organizing Data Analytics

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16768

Authors: Ricardo Alonso; Odilon Camara

Abstract: We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main trade-offs in organizing data generation, analysis and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, while the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and implementation.

Keywords: Strategic Experimentation; Bayesian Persuasion; Tampering; Organizational Design; Information Technology; Audit

JEL Codes: D8; D83; M10


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Increasing auditing intensity (M42)Reducing the informativeness of the designer's experiment (C90)
Principal's choice to audit (M42)Influencing the agent's behavior (C92)
Perfect audit (M42)Lack of surplus for the principal (D52)
Imperfect audit (M42)Balancing the trade-off between informativeness and tampering (D82)
Separating the design task from the analysis task (C38)Preventing the designer from incurring tampering costs (D47)
Preventing the designer from incurring tampering costs (D47)Leading to more informative experiments (C90)
Integrated tasks (Y80)Economizing on tampering costs (D23)
Economizing on tampering costs (D23)Diminishing the quality of the experiments (C90)
Promoting a moderate sense of mistrust (D80)Fostering a culture of healthy skepticism (C92)
Fostering a culture of healthy skepticism (C92)Ensuring the principal demands stronger evidence before acting on the agent's recommendations (D80)

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