Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16659
Authors: Andrew Beauchamp; Rossella Calvi; Scott Fulford
Abstract: The Indian marriage market is characterized by extensive female migration, sizable dowries, and the widespread practice of arranged marriage. We develop and estimate a dynamic, general equilibrium, two-sided matching model with non-transferable utility to recover women's and men's preferences over spousal characteristics (such as age and education) and features of their marriage (including migration upon marriage, dowry payments, and women's involvement in the choice of their spouse). In counterfactual simulations, we study how changes in sex-ratios, women's education, and the practice of dowry, arranged marriage, and child marriage affect the equilibrium match and welfare in the marriage market.
Keywords: matching; marriage; directed search; migration; india; dowry; arranged marriage; child marriage
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| decrease in the sex ratio (J11) | increase in women's match rates (J16) |
| decrease in the sex ratio (J11) | decrease in men's match rates (J79) |
| increase in women's education (I24) | lower match rates at younger ages (J26) |
| increase in women's education (I24) | increase in average age at marriage (J12) |
| increase in women's education (I24) | narrow spousal age gap (J12) |
| increase in women's education (I24) | reduced welfare for both men and women (I38) |
| shift towards love marriages (J12) | older ages at marriage (J12) |
| shift towards love marriages (J12) | reduction in welfare for both sides (D69) |
| limiting dowry transfers (G59) | increase in marriage migration (J12) |
| limiting dowry transfers (G59) | reduction in likelihood of arranged marriages (J12) |
| limiting dowry transfers (G59) | decrease in welfare in the marriage market (J12) |
| banning child marriage (J12) | welfare gains for older women (I38) |
| banning child marriage (J12) | losses for men and young women (J17) |