Mobility Responses to the Establishment of a Residential Tax Haven: Evidence from Switzerland

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16627

Authors: Isabel Z. Martínez

Abstract: I analyze mobility responses to a tax reform that established the Swiss canton of Obwalden as a tax haven in 2006. The reform, which included a regressive income tax schedule, was explicitly aimed at attracting the top 1%. Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimations comparing Obwalden to all other cantons confirm that the reform successfully attracted high-income taxpayers: by 2016, the share of top earners in the canton had doubled, and average income per taxpayer was 16% higher relative to 2005. Based on individual tax return data, I estimate the mobility elasticity with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, which isolates the identifying variation in the tax rate stemming from the 2006 reform only. I find a large elasticity of the stock of high-income taxpayers of 1.5–2 with respect to the net-of- average-tax rate. The corresponding flow elasticity is 7.2. Despite these large behavioral responses, the reform did not increase revenue per capita in the canton. Finally, I find small positive effects on local employment. However, in-movers with high incomes were not more likely to also work in the canton, and I cannot rule out that employment effects were driven by the simultaneous reduction in corporate income taxes.

Keywords: mobility; personal income tax; local taxes; tax competition; regressive income tax

JEL Codes: H24; H31; H71; H73; R23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
tax reform in Obwalden (H29)increase in share of high-income taxpayers (H24)
tax reform in Obwalden (H29)increase in average income per taxpayer (H29)
tax reform in Obwalden (H29)no increase in revenue per capita for the canton (H29)
tax reform in Obwalden (H29)small positive effects on local employment (J68)
high-income inmovers (J61)not more likely to work in Obwalden (J79)
tax reform in Obwalden (H29)elasticity of stock of high-income taxpayers with respect to net-of-average tax rate (H31)
tax reform in Obwalden (H29)flow elasticity of high-income taxpayers (H31)

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