Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16597
Authors: Petra Persson; Nikita Roketskiy; Samuel Lee
Abstract: We analyze the diffusion of rival information in a social network. In our model, rational agents can share information sequentially, unconstrained by an exogenous protocol or timing. We show how to compute the set of eventually informed agents for any network, and show that it is essentially unique under altruistic preferences. The relationship between network structure and information diffusion is complex because the former shapes both the charity and confidentiality of potential senders and receivers.
Keywords: social networks; strategic information transmission; rival information
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| network structure (D85) | information diffusion (D85) |
| trust relationships (L14) | information diffusion (D85) |
| network structure (D85) | trust relationships (L14) |
| trustworthiness of uninformed agents (D82) | informed agent's willingness to share information (D82) |
| network topology (D85) | information diffusion (D85) |
| network structure (D85) | equilibrium constellation of trust (C62) |