Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16386
Authors: Gianmarco Len Ciliotta; Matteo Bobba; Tim Ederer; Chris Neilson; Marco Nieddu
Abstract: This paper studies how increasing teacher compensation at hard-to-staff schools can reduce inequality in access to qualified teachers. Leveraging an unconditional change in the structure of teacher compensation in Peru, we first show causal evidence that increasing salaries at less desirable locations attracts teachers who score 0.45 standard deviations higher in standardized competency tests, leading to an average increase in student test scores of 0.33-0.38 standard deviations. We then estimate a model of teacher preferences over local amenities, school characteristics, and wages using geocoded job postings and rich application data from the nationwide centralized teacher assignment system. A policy that sets compensation at each job posting taking into account teacher preferences is more cost-effective than the actual policy in termsof reducing structural inequality in access to learning opportunities, and it possibly enhances the efficiency of the education system.
Keywords: inequality; teacher school choice; teacher wages; matching with contracts
JEL Codes: J31; J45; I21; C93; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increased teacher compensation (J39) | increased demand for teaching positions (J23) |
| increased demand for teaching positions (J23) | improved student outcomes (I24) |
| increased teacher compensation (J39) | improved teacher quality (I21) |
| improved teacher quality (I21) | improved student outcomes (I24) |
| design of compensation schemes (J33) | efficiency of the education system (I21) |