Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16347
Authors: Catherine Guirkinger; Jean-Philippe Platteau; Zaki Wahhaj
Abstract: Arranged marriage is a persisting practice in many migrant communities in Western Europe and North America. How can arranged marriages survive in conditions where migrants are exposed to the individualistic values and behavior patterns of the host society, and where divorce is easy and public safety nets are in place is a puzzling question. To answer it, we build a novel theory in which parents and children bargain over the choice of a spouse. We show that, perhaps paradoxically, the possibility of divorce may help preserve arranged marriage. This is especially true for women who are more constrained once married. To test the prediction of the model, we exploit a change in the divorce law in Belgium (introduction of no-fault divorce in 2007). On the basis of two unique sets of data on descendants of Turkish migrants, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, men's propensity to marry an imported bride decreases while the same evolution is not observed for women. If anything, the latter's propensity to marry an imported groom has increased. Similarly, men's { but not women's { propensity to divorce decreases following the law change.
Keywords: gender; family economics; marriage; non-western immigrants
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
Cause | Effect |
---|---|
no-fault divorce introduction in 2007 (J12) | marriage choices among Turkish migrants (J12) |
no-fault divorce introduction in 2007 (J12) | men's propensity to marry an imported bride (J12) |
no-fault divorce introduction in 2007 (J12) | women's propensity to marry an imported groom (J12) |
no-fault divorce introduction in 2007 (J12) | men's propensity to divorce (J12) |
no-fault divorce introduction in 2007 (J12) | women's propensity to divorce (J12) |
the possibility of divorce (J12) | women's acceptance of arranged marriages (J12) |