Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1625

Authors: Rudolf Kerschbamer; Yanni Tournas

Abstract: This paper studies the factors determining plant size and interplant output allocation within the boundaries of a multiplant firm under conditions of demand uncertainty. It shows that asymmetric information between headquarters and individual plants is one factor determining plant size and output allocation: since the existence of excess capacity creates ?high powered? incentives for individual plants, capacity levels in a second-best setting exceed the corresponding benchmark in a first-best world if capacity prices are low. The presence of ?agency costs? in the case of fully-utilized capacity reverses this result for high-capacity prices. Also, in a recession output is not necessarily assigned to the plant with the lowest production costs.

Keywords: multiplant firm; excess capacity; asymmetric information

JEL Codes: D82; L22; L23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
excess capacity (D24)high-powered incentives for individual plants (M52)
high-powered incentives for individual plants (M52)optimal output allocation decisions (L21)
optimal output allocation decisions (L21)not necessarily assigned to lowest production costs (D20)
excess capacity (D24)competition among plants (D41)
competition among plants (D41)increase in profits by reducing average production costs (D24)
average cost of output provision (D24)increasing in demand for given capacities (D25)

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