Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16052
Authors: Massimo Anelli; Tommaso Colussi; Andrea Ichino
Abstract: Migration movements may increase the geographic dispersion of the Aversion to Breaking Rules (ABR) in a population, with possible long-term economic consequences. We show this result with Italian Census data, using indicators of false birth date registrations for families of South-North migrants and remainers in the two macro-regions. Within locality$\times$biennium cells, deterrence and cheating benefits are similar in the two groups and thus cheating differences are informative about the underlying ABR, as our theory suggests. We also exploit the Fascist reforms of 1926 as shocks to deterrence, offering additional information on the underlying ABR of migrant and remainer families.
Keywords: migration; aversion to breaking rules; Italy
JEL Codes: J61; C93; R23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| fascist reforms of 1926 (P16) | decrease in cheating behaviors (C92) |
| migration movements (F22) | geographic dispersion of aversion to breaking rules (abr) (Z13) |
| families of migrants (F22) | higher aversion to breaking rules (abr) than remainers (D91) |
| significant migration outflows (F22) | abr drain in localities (R53) |
| abr drain (Y60) | lower labor productivity in localities (F66) |