Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16041
Authors: Pierre-Andre Chiappori; Bernard Salani
Abstract: This is the first draft of a chapter prepared for the Handbook Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandra Voena eds, Elsevier North Holland.
Keywords: Family Economics; Marriage; Divorce; Human Capital
JEL Codes: D13; J12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| marriage generates a surplus (J12) | individuals achieve higher levels of well-being together than they would as singles (I31) |
| premarital investments (J12) | amount of surplus generated (D46) |
| premarital investments (J12) | allocation of surplus within the marriage (D14) |
| risk-sharing within households (D14) | alleviates market inefficiencies (D61) |
| risk-sharing within households (D14) | improves utility outcomes compared to singlehood (J12) |
| allocation of surplus between partners (E25) | joint surplus created by a match (C78) |