Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16037
Authors: Hans Gersbach; Philippe Muller; Oriol Tejada
Abstract: We examine how tightening reelection hurdles for incumbents can curb political polarization and increase welfare. We use a two-period model in which a politician is elected for office in the first period and enacts a new policy. In the second period, elections take place between the incumbent and a challenger, and the winning candidate chooses the extent to which the first-period policy is reformed. Reforming a policy is costly, and such costs increase with the policy shift and are borne by parties and voters. We show that raising the vote-share needed for re-election above one half reduces policy polarization and increases welfare. Moreover, the latter measures depend on the re-election threshold in a non-monotonic way and a particular (intermediate) threshold simultaneously minimizes policy polarization and maximizes welfare.
Keywords: Elections; Political Polarization; Costs of Change; Reelection Hurdles
JEL Codes: C72; D72; D78; H4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| reelection hurdle (D72) | policy polarization (D72) |
| reelection hurdle (D72) | welfare (I38) |
| reelection hurdle (D72) | median voter's policies (D72) |
| policy polarization (D72) | welfare (I38) |
| reelection hurdle (D72) | likelihood of turnover (J63) |
| likelihood of turnover (J63) | expected costs of policy change (H59) |
| reelection hurdle (D72) | optimal extrahurdle (Y60) |