Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP16012
Authors: Alessandra Casella; Jeffrey Guo; Michelle Jiang
Abstract: Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions.
Keywords: Voting; Turnout; Minority Protection; Laboratory Experiments; Costly Voting
JEL Codes: C92; D72; K16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Cumulative Voting (CV) (D79) | Minority Turnout (J15) |
| Cumulative Voting (CV) (D79) | Minority Representation (J15) |
| Cumulative Voting (CV) (D79) | Majority Turnout (D79) |
| Cumulative Voting (CV) (D79) | Likelihood of Minority Candidates Winning Seats (D79) |